

Elections Chile 2021: populism, divisive issues, and the rise of new parties on Facebook

Elecciones Chile 2021: populismo, temas divisivos y triunfo de los nuevos partidos en Facebook

Eleições Chile 2021: populismo, temas divisores e vitória dos novos partidos no Facebook

Percy Peña-Vicuña, Universidad Católica del Norte, Antofagasta, Chile (ppenav@ucn.cl)

Vicente Fenoll, Universidad de Valencia, Valencia, España (vicente.fenoll@uv.es)

Pamela Romero-Lizama, Universidad de Playa Ancha, Valparaíso, Chile (pamela.romero@upla.cl)

ABSTRACT | Social networks offer a digital communication space that helps to disseminate the messages of political actors. Studying the strategies used on these channels can help to understand social dynamics, especially in the context of electoral processes. However, most research on political communication focuses on democracies in the Northern Hemisphere. To fill this gap, this study examines the Facebook accounts of Chilean political actors during the first round of the 2021 presidential election campaign, analyzing from a quantitative perspective, the content of the posts of the seven main parties and candidates. The corpus consists of a sample of 909 posts that were manually coded according to the categories of topic, populism, and negative campaigning. At the party level, differences are examined on the basis of ideology and institutional novelty. The results show that newer and more radical opposition political formations use populist rhetoric and divisive issues. However, the level of populism in this campaign is lower than in other regions, and the absence of attacks against ethnic or cultural minorities stands out. The analysis of user engagement shows that newer parties generate more interaction with their content and gain greater visibility as a result. These findings provide a detailed insight into the digital communication strategies used during the election campaign in Chile and help to broaden the focus of political communication studies to the South American context.

KEYWORDS: political communication, Chile, Facebook, populism, negative campaigning, elections, content analysis, user participation.

FORMA DE CITAR

Peña-Vicuña, P.; Fenoll, V. & Romero-Lizama, P. (2024) Chile 2021: populismo, temas divisivos y triunfo de los nuevos partidos en Facebook. *Cuadernos.info*, (58), 208-229. <https://doi.org/10.7764/cdi.58.65957>

RESUMEN | *Las redes sociales ofrecen un espacio digital de comunicación que ayuda a diseminar los mensajes de los actores políticos. El estudio de las estrategias utilizadas en estos canales puede ayudar a comprender las dinámicas sociales, especialmente las relacionadas con procesos electorales. Con base en la investigación sobre comunicación política en América Latina, este estudio aporta al conocimiento examinando las cuentas de Facebook de los actores políticos chilenos durante la campaña de la primera vuelta de las elecciones presidenciales de 2021. Desde una perspectiva cuantitativa, se analiza el contenido de las publicaciones de los siete principales partidos y candidatos. El corpus está compuesto por una muestra de 909 publicaciones, codificadas manualmente según las categorías tema, populismo y campaña negativa. A nivel partido, se comprueban las diferencias según ideología y novedad institucional. Los resultados muestran un uso de retórica populista y temas divisivos por parte de las formaciones políticas opositoras más nuevas y radicales. No obstante, el nivel de populismo durante esta campaña es inferior al detectado en otras latitudes y destaca la ausencia de ataques contra minorías étnicas o culturales. El análisis de la participación de los usuarios revela que los partidos más nuevos son los que generan una mayor interacción con sus contenidos, que obtienen mayor visibilidad. Estos hallazgos proporcionan una visión detallada de las estrategias de comunicación digital utilizadas durante la campaña electoral en Chile y contribuyen a ampliar el foco de los estudios de comunicación política al ámbito sudamericano.*

PALABRAS CLAVE: *comunicación política, Chile, Facebook, populismo, campaña negativa, elecciones, análisis de contenido, participación usuarios*

RESUMO | *As redes sociais oferecem um espaço digital de comunicação que ajuda a disseminar as mensagens dos atores políticos. O estudo das estratégias usadas nesses canais pode ajudar a entender as dinâmicas sociais, especialmente aquelas relacionadas a processos eleitorais. No entanto, a maioria das pesquisas sobre comunicação política se concentra em democracias do hemisfério norte. Para superar essa lacuna, este estudo examina as contas do Facebook dos atores políticos chilenos durante a campanha do primeiro turno das eleições presidenciais de 2021. De uma perspectiva quantitativa, analisa-se o conteúdo das postagens dos sete principais partidos e candidatos. O corpus é composto por uma amostra de 909 postagens, codificadas manualmente de acordo com as categorias tema, populismo e campanha negativa. No nível do partido, as diferenças são verificadas com base na ideologia e na novidade institucional. Os resultados revelam o uso de retórica populista e temas divisores por formações políticas de oposição mais novas e radicais. No entanto, o nível de populismo durante esta campanha é menor do que o detectado em outras regiões, e destaca-se a ausência de ataques contra minorias étnicas ou culturais. A análise da participação dos usuários mostra que os partidos mais novos são os que geram mais interação com seu conteúdo, obtendo assim maior visibilidade. Essas descobertas fornecem uma visão detalhada das estratégias de comunicação digital utilizadas durante a campanha eleitoral no Chile e contribuem para ampliar o foco dos estudos de comunicação política para o contexto sul-americano.*

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: *comunicação política, Chile, Facebook, populismo, campanha negativa, eleições, análise de conteúdo, participação dos usuários*

INTRODUCTION

In the last decade, new technologies have transformed political communication, giving rise to phenomena such as disinformation and populism, making digital campaign strategies crucial for electoral success (Sierra & Rodríguez-Virgili, 2020; Taras & Davis, 2022). Despite the notion that studies on political communication in social networks are mainly conducted in the United States and Europe (Dimitrova & Matthes, 2018), research in Latin America has made remarkable progress and provides relevant analysis on the impact of these networks on regional politics.

Latin American research has investigated a variety of topics, such as strategies in electoral campaigns (López-López & Vásquez-González, 2018), voter engagement in social networks (Calvo et al., 2023), effects of political disinformation (Valenzuela et al., 2022), political polarization (Muñiz, 2021; Valenzuela et al., 2021), the use of social networks for political campaigns and political participation (Luna et al., 2022; Scherman et al., 2011) and populism (Brandao, 2022; Pallister, 2021; Siles et al., 2023; Waisbord, 2018). These studies show that Latin America offers important perspectives that enrich the global understanding of political communication in the digital age and provide empirical evidence of unique and common phenomena in different sociopolitical contexts.

The increasing use of social networks as key tools for political communication in Chile is reflected in the popularity of Facebook, which maintains a 75 penetration rate despite competition, facilitated by technological advances and connectivity (Newman et al., 2023). This demonstrates the relevance of Facebook for political actors as it allows them to reach a wide and diverse audience and interact in a direct and personalized way. Therefore, analyzing political messages on this platform is crucial for understanding political communication strategies and their impact (Fenoll, 2022; Luna et al., 2022).

The Chilean presidential elections of 2021, which took place in a post-pandemic context and after a constitutional plebiscite (Meléndez et al., 2021), are an interesting case for the study of digital political communication. In this case, the online-only campaign of PDG candidate Franco Parisi, which was conducted from the United States due to legal restrictions, stands out and shows the change in electoral dynamics. This period marks a transition in the Chilean political landscape, with the emergence of new political parties that challenge the duopoly of traditional coalitions and represent a diversity of ideologies and origins, including the left, center-right and far-right (Rovira Kaltwasser, 2023).

The 2021 elections reflect this change. The candidates of the new parties, such as Gabriel Boric, Franco Parisi and José Antonio Kast, challenged the traditional political parties and encounter an anti-political sentiment (Rojas Casimiro et al.,

2022). This study analyzes the strategies and style of political communication adopted by political actors and parties during the first electoral round and evaluates the elements that led to greater interaction with users in order to contribute to a deeper understanding of these phenomena in the Chilean political context and in the field of digital political communication in Latin America.

To this end, this article is organized as follows: section two provides a literature review that complements the theoretical framework of our analysis. Section three explains the methodology used to study the Facebook postings of political actors during the elections. Section four presents the main findings, showing how divisive issues and populist rhetoric dominated political communication and led to greater interaction on the platform between new and extreme parties. Finally, section five discusses the implications of these findings for political practice and future research, emphasizing the importance of digital communication strategies in Chile's current political context.

POLITICAL COMMUNICATION AND SOCIAL NETWORKS

The evolution of political communication towards the use of social networks, particularly Facebook, has changed the way candidates and parties interact with voters, providing a direct channel that bypasses the intermediation of journalists and traditional media (Waisbord, 2018). This shift to the digital realm has significantly increased access to these platforms and expanded the potential for users to actively engage in the political process through online participation (Lusoli, 2005). However, this direct approach can have a negative impact on the quality of public debate and the legitimacy of democratic institutions, contributing to political and social polarization (Fenoll, 2022). On Facebook, political communication tends to be self-centered and seeks to capture users' attention with its own narrative, focusing on salient issues, populist communication and negative campaigning (Bene et al., 2022).

Bene et al. (2022) find that topical and divisive issues, such as migration in Europe, generate more user interaction in certain political campaigns. In contrast, structural and enduring issues on the political agenda, such as the economy, social policy and domestic issues, attract less interaction due to their constant nature (Bene et al., 2022). Emerging parties tend to focus on divisive issues to increase their visibility, which can increase polarization in social networks.

In the Chilean case, citizens in the 2021 presidential election believed that the government should focus its efforts on solving the following problems: crime (42%), pensions (41%), health (38%), education (35%), poverty (23%), corruption (20%), drug trafficking (17%), housing (12%), inequality (12%), environment (8%),

pandemic (7%), immigration (6%), human rights (6%) and public transportation (2%) ("Estudio Nacional...", 2021).

According to this, the new Chilean political actors focused on current, divisive issues (over 10% in the polls) such as crime, poverty, corruption, drug trafficking and inequality during the election campaign on Facebook. In contrast, they paid less attention to routine political agenda items such as pensions, health, education, housing and public transportation. Therefore:

H1. New Chilean political actors will focus the election campaign on Facebook on divisive current issues.

Recent studies show an increasing use of populism in election campaigns on social networks, especially in the speeches of extreme and opposition parties (Ernst et al., 2017; De Vreese et al., 2018; Luna & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2021; Fenoll, 2022). This phenomenon, which has led to electoral successes worldwide (Nai, 2018; Güvercin, 2022), is understood as a communication style (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; De Vreese et al., 2018) that emphasizes the dichotomy between the people and the elite, anti-elitism and attacks on out-groups (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). Emerging political parties tend to adopt more populist rhetoric than traditional parties (Moffitt, 2016). Viviani and Marco (2019), through a textual analysis of the programs of Podemos (Spain) and the Five Star Movement (M5S) (Italy), confirm that populist rhetoric is a key strategy of new political actors to differentiate themselves from traditional parties and emphasize the gap between the people and the elite. In Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro used social networks to address voters directly and mobilize his supporters, an unconventional practice compared to the usual communication strategies of the other candidates (Brandao, 2022). Against this background, it is hypothesized that:

H2. New political actors use a higher level of populist communication on Facebook than their opponents.

The type of populist rhetoric on Facebook can also differ depending on the ideology of the actors. For example, radical right-wing parties encourage exclusionary populist discourse and attacks on the media elite, while the left directs its criticism at the economic elite and in defense of social rights (Reinemann et al., 2016). Fenoll (2022) provides a detailed analysis of the 2019 European Parliament elections in Spain and finds that right-wing political parties tend to use exclusionary populist rhetoric, while left-wing parties focus more on attacks on the economic elite. This leads to the thesis that:

H3. There are ideological differences in the type of populist communication used by the new Chilean political parties.

Another relevant aspect is the negative campaigning, characterized by an emotional style of communication that focuses on highlighting the opponent's weaknesses rather than one's own strengths. There is consensus that this strategy undermines democratic quality by shifting the focus of debate from constructive proposals to conflict (Nai & Walter, 2015; Nai, 2018; Bene et al., 2022). Meanwhile, the electoral effectiveness of negative campaigning is controversial. Pallister (2021), for example, reports a notable absence of negative messages in candidates' campaigns during the first round of the 2019 presidential election in Guatemala, where attacks on political rivals were rare. However, there is evidence that negative campaigning can increase online visibility and engagement (Papp & Patkos, 2019), which is a potential advantage for new political actors. One example is Jair Bolsonaro's campaign in Brazil in 2018, which saw higher levels of negativity and interaction in his Twitter posts and Facebook Live videos. This content, which often included personalized and direct communication with voters and attacks against the media and the Workers' Party (PT), managed to win the majority of interactions and views in the second round of the election (Brandao, 2022). This shows that in the context of digital hypermediation, where algorithms and user interactions seem to play a crucial role in the dissemination and impact of political content, negative campaigns can be amplified, further contributing to the affective polarization and visibility of such actors (Milli et al., 2023). Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis:

H4. New parties and the use of negative campaigning generate more user interaction.

METHOD

This study examines the Facebook communication of all political actors who participated in the first round of the 2021 Chilean presidential elections. Specifically, it analyzes the accounts of Eduardo Artés and his party Unión Patriótica (UPA), Gabriel Boric and his party Convergencia Social, (CS), since the account of his coalition, Apruebo Dignidad, was inactive during the elections; Marco Enríquez-Ominami and the Partido Progresista PRO); Yasna Provoste and the Christian Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiano, PDC), as the account of the Nuevo Pacto Social coalition was also inactive, Franco Parisi and the Partido de la Gente (PDG), Sebastián Sichel for the coalition Chile Chile Podemos Más (ChP+), whose account was inactive, and José Antonio Kast and the Partido Republicano (PLR), as the account of the coalition Frente Social Cristiano did not exist. The parties are ordered from left to right according to their ideology (Wiesehomeier et al., 2021): UPA, CS, and PRO on the left and PDC, PDG, ChP+, and PLR on the right.

CS, PDG, and PLR are new parties contesting a presidential election for the first time. Although the UPA was an extra-parliamentary formation in 2021, it is not considered new as it already participated in the 2017 presidential election.

The analysis period covers the four weeks before the first round of the election, from October 25 to November 21, 2021. From a quantitative perspective, a content analysis of the posts published on Facebook during this period is conducted. A stratified random sample of 909 posts, drawn from a total of 2,761 posts, is coded. This sample corresponds to 50% of the publications, after matching the number of publications of the candidate Franco Parisi and his party PDG with the average number of publications of the candidates and parties respectively. This procedure is used to generate more homogeneous groups, as Parisi and his party published a disproportionately high number of messages during the election campaign (1,361 posts), i.e. almost half of all publications.

The posts were downloaded using the CrowdTangle application (<http://www.CrowdTangle.com>) and coded by the authors of the study. For the design of the variables, we used a version of the codebook developed by the DigiWorld team (Haßler et al., 2021), adapted to the Ibero-American context and available in an online repository. The coding process began after successfully passing the intercoder test with a random sample of 100 contributions.

Table 1 (next page) shows a detailed description of the analyzed categories as well as the reliability values obtained in the Holsti CR test. Each category was independently coded as present or absent in the post. All receive a reliability coefficient of more than 0.8, as recommended by various authors (Lacy et al., 2015).

To test the first hypothesis, the messages of political actors on Facebook are classified according to the topic of the post (table 1): polity, politics, and policies (political agenda topics). The politics category consists of the main concerns of Chilean citizens during the campaign for the first round of the 2021 presidential elections (Estudio Nacional de Opinión Pública, 2021; Espacio Público-Ipsos, 2021): pensions, corruption, crime, human rights, education, employment, poverty, environment, drug trafficking, health, housing, inequality, immigration and pandemics.

H2 and H3 are tested using the variable populism, which classifies the presence of different types of populist content in the publications, grouped in the three dimensions proposed by de Vreese et al. (2018): 1) antagonistic representation of the people; 2) attacks against elites (political, economic and media); and 3) attacks against external groups (ideological or ethnic). The populism index is calculated on the basis of these elements, with each available dimension adding one point. The range is from 0 (no populist communication) to 3 (three dimensions present).

Category	Description	Holsti CR
Polity	Normative aspects of politics, such as constitutional reform and the state model.	.91
Politics	Processual aspects of politics, such as elections and election campaigns.	.89
Retirement	Retirement pension or senior citizenship issues.	.99
Corruption	Corruption scandals and proposals for democratic renewal.	.99
Crime	Crime, delinquency and citizen insecurity.	.99
Human rights	Civil rights and minority rights policies.	.95
Education	Education system and research.	.97
Employment	Labor policy, wages, and unemployment.	.98
Poverty	Fight against poverty and marginalization.	.99
Environment	Environmental and animal rights policy.	.99
Narcotrafficking	Fight against drug trafficking.	1
Health	National health system.	.98
Housing	Housing policy.	.98
Inequality	Social and economic inequality.	.93
Immigration	Migration and integration policies.	1
Pandemic	Management of COVID-19 pandemic.	1
People	People as a homogeneous unit threatened by external groups.	.93
Political elite	Attacks on the political elite that has abused the people's trust.	.93
Economic elite	The economic elite is held responsible for the problems of the people.	1
Media elite	The media elite is accused of siding with the powerful and not reporting in the interests of the people.	.97
Attack on minorities	Attacks on ethnic or cultural minorities because they pose a threat to the population.	1
Ideological attacks	Attacks on ideologies that are considered harmful.	.99
Negative campaign	Criticizing political opponents in order to worsen their public image	.94

Table 1. Coding categories, descriptions and inter-coder reliability coefficients for each code

Source: Own elaboration.

Finally, H4 is operationalized by the negative campaign variable, which classifies messages that contain attacks against political opponents, such as insults or disqualifications, in order to undermine their credibility. User interaction is calculated by the sum of all interactions each post receives (reactions, shares and comments).

RESULTS

Table 2 shows the frequency of publications by the individual political actors according to the topic of the contribution. In general, it can be seen that the Chilean campaign focuses mainly on programmatic elements (policies), which appear in more than half of the posts (53.6%), and on procedural aspects of politics, such as the electoral campaign and the party campaign, with a similar percentage (51.1%). Among the policies, the proposals on human rights (12.8%), such as indigenous peoples and equality policies, the economy (9.7%), the environment (9.1%), pensions (8.9%), the education system (7%) and the health system (6.9%) stand out. The low relevance of current issues is striking. Although inequality, crime, corruption, drug trafficking and poverty are at the forefront of Chilean citizens' concerns during the election campaign, they are barely present in the political messages on Facebook. Institutional and normative elements of politics (polity), such as the reform of the Constitution, also appeared in 7.5% of messages.

	Autor del post							Total
	UPA	CS	PRO	PDC	PDG	ChP+	PLR	
Polity	11.1%	9.6%	9.2%	10.2%	3.8%	1.5%	6.8%	7.5%
Politics	66.7%	37.9%	55.1%	48.8%	62.2%	44.8%	63.6%	53.1%
Policies:	37.8%	68.9%	54.6%	59.8%	39.2%	67.2%	43.2%	53.6%
Human rights	13.3%	32.8%	9.7%	12.6%	3.8%	9.0%	3.4%	12.8%
Economy	2.2%	6.8%	9.7%	8.7%	12.4%	16.4%	9.1%	9.7%
Environment	2.2%	17.5%	8.2%	13.4%	4.3%	11.9%	1.1%	9.1%
Retirement	0.0%	16.4%	12.8%	8.7%	3.3%	11.9%	1.1%	8.9%
Education	8.9%	10.2%	4.1%	14.2%	4.8%	7.5%	1.1%	7.0%
Health system	2.2%	15.8%	3.6%	9.4%	3.8%	7.5%	2.3%	6.9%
Inequality	4.4%	6.8%	5.6%	4.7%	0.5%	3.0%	0.0%	3.7%
Crime	0.0%	1.1%	1.0%	8.7%	0.0%	9.0%	12.5%	3.5%
Employment	2.2%	2.8%	2.0%	6.3%	0.0%	1.5%	0.0%	2.1%
Corruption	8.9%	1.1%	1.5%	0.0%	4.3%	1.5%	0.0%	2.1%
Narcotrafficking	0.0%	0.6%	1.0%	3.9%	0.0%	3.0%	8.0%	1.9%
Housing	0.0%	1.7%	3.1%	4.7%	0.0%	0.0%	1.1%	1.8%
Immigration	0.0%	0.6%	0.0%	0.0%	1.0%	3.0%	2.3%	0.8%
Poverty	0.0%	0.0%	1.0%	0.8%	0.5%	3.0%	1.1%	0.8%
Non-political topic	0.0%	2.8%	4.1%	3.1%	4.8%	6.0%	8.0%	4.2%
Posts	45	177	196	127	209	67	88	909

Note: more than one topic may be present in the post. Parties are ordered from left to right according to their ideology (Wiesehomeier et al., 2021).

Table 2. Frequency of publications by topic of post and political actor

Source: Own elaboration.

If we focus on the discursive strategies used by the political formations (H1), the results show differences between the new parties. In its campaign, the CS focuses mainly on human rights and the environment, two issues that are not very relevant according to the polls, as well as on current routine issues such as pensions, health and education. To a lesser extent, it also includes inequality in its messages. The PDG makes few concrete proposals on the issues on the political agenda and relies on a strategy that focuses on the elections, e.g. in the form of election surveys and the promotion of online election events. The PLR also relies on a strategy based on the promotion of its electoral campaign, but with a focus on crime and drug trafficking, two of the current divisive issues in the polls.

To test whether the new political actors use higher levels of populist communication (H2), we conducted a one-way ANOVA test. Given the heterogeneity of variances, we performed the Welch test for equality of means, which yielded a positive result [$F(6, 262.32)=14.65, p<.001$]. Table 3 shows the average populist communication index by political actor. The analysis of the results shows three blocks of parties according to the degree of use of populist communication in their campaign strategy.

First, the proportion of populist communication is particularly high for the UPA, a radical left minority party, which tops the ranking ($M=0.56$). Populist discourse is also used intensively by two parties running in the presidential elections for the first time: the center-right PDG ($M=0.40$) and the radical right PLR ($M=0.23$), which received the most votes in the first round. In second place, we find more veteran parties such as the progressive PRO ($M=0.13$) and the radical right ChP+ ($M=0.10$) of the outgoing government, which occupy an intermediate position with a softer populist discourse. In this sense, the radical parties in opposition seem to be the ones that use a more populist communication and that occupying positions of power softens their discourse. Finally, populist discourse is hardly present in moderate traditional parties such as the PDC ($M=0.03$) or the new and left CS ($M=0.03$), which came second in the first round of elections and ended up winning the elections. Post-hoc Games-Howell tests show that the differences between the first and the last block are statistically significant: UPA ($p<.05$), PDC ($p<.001$) and PLR ($p<.05$) have significantly higher levels of populist speech than PDC and CS. Therefore, the hypothesis is partially rejected as only two of the three new parties use a more populist communication style.

Table 4 shows the frequency of populist posts by political actor and type of populist content (H3). Populist statements can be found in 13.9% of the messages posted on Facebook during the election campaign. Opposition parties that are at the extremes are the most populist, especially minority parties such as the left-wing UPA.

	N	M	SD	SE	95% confidence interval for the mean	
					Lower limit	Upper limit
UPA	45	.56	.967	.144	.27	.85
CS	177	.03	.197	.015	.00	.06
PRO	196	.13	.429	.031	.07	.19
PDC	127	.03	.175	.016	.00	.06
PDG	209	.40	.658	.046	.31	.49
ChP+	67	.10	.394	.048	.01	.20
PLR	88	.23	.519	.055	.12	.34
Total	909	.19	.509	.017	.15	.22

Note: the table shows the mean of the populist communication index according to political actor and its respective 95% confidence interval. Parties are ordered from left to right according to their political ideology (Wiesehomeier et al., 2021).

Table 3. Mean of populist communication index by political actor

Source: Own elaboration.

	Party							
	UPA	CS	PRO	PDC	PDG	ChP+	PLR	Total
People	20%	2.3%	4.6%	1.6%	11.5%	6%	5.7%	45.2%
Political elite	22.2%	0%	3.1%	0%	23%	3%	1.1%	53.2%
Economic elite	6.7%	0%	1%	0%	3.3%	0%	0%	9.5%
Media elite	2.2%	0%	2%	0%	8.6%	0%	1.1%	19.0%
Attack on minorities	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Ideological attacks	11.1%	0.6%	4.1%	1.6%	1%	1.5%	14.8%	25.4%
Total	31.1%	2.3%	9.7%	3.1%	30.6%	7.5%	18.2%	13.9%

Note: more than one type of populism may be present in the post. Parties are ordered from left to right according to their ideology (Wiesehomeier et al., 2021).

Table 4. Frequency of posts with populist content by political actor

Source: Own elaboration.

Populist messages are more frequent in the conservative bloc (18.1% of conservative posts) than in the progressive bloc (8.9% of progressive posts). Of the two parties of the Chilean radical right, the opposition PLR uses a higher degree of populism than the ruling ChP+. However, the moderate PDG is at the forefront of populist discourse in the center-right, spreading populist messages in almost every third post.

If we analyze the differences in the type of populist content, the radical parties in opposition are those that use a greater number of exclusionary ideological attacks, such as the political positioning of the UPA: “Capitalism is one of the main enemies to fight” (*el Capitalismo es uno de los principales enemigos a combatir*) (UPA, 2021). Within the conservative bloc, there are important differences between the parties: the radical PLR bases its populist discourse on exclusionary attacks against what it calls the ideological model of “the "radical left that leads us to underdevelopment” (*la izquierda radical que nos lleva al subdesarrollo*) (Kast, 2021); the moderate PDG, on the other hand, hardly uses this exclusionary strategy and focuses its attacks on elites, especially politicians. To a lesser extent, the PDG also attacks the economic elite. The complete absence of attacks against minorities in the messages of all the Chilean political actors studied is striking.

To test the role of the use of negative campaigning and the novelty of the parties in user interaction (H4), we conducted a two-way ANOVA test. The results show that the interaction between the novelty of the party and the use of negative campaigning is not significant [$F(1, 905)=0.004, p=.950$]. The use of negative campaigning also does not lead to a greater interaction [$F(1, 905)=1.35, p=.245$]. On the other hand, the differences with regard to the novelty of the parties are statistically significant. [$F(1, 905)=21.07, p<.001$].

First elections	Campaign type	M	SD	N
No	Neutral	1255.35	3330.338	380
	Negative	1703.60	1934.368	55
	Total	1312.02	3189.577	435
Yes	Neutral	3098.60	4546.506	426
	Negative	3597.75	3074.338	48
	Total	3149.14	4419.835	474
Total	Neutral	2229.57	4120.993	806
	Negative	2586.31	2690.285	103
	Total	2269.99	3985.221	909

Table 5. Mean number of interactions by negative campaign use and party novelty

Source: Own elaboration.

DISCUSSION

In this discussion, we evaluate the hypotheses regarding the political communication strategies used by political actors during the first round of the 2021 Chilean presidential elections. These findings, together with those from Europe and North America, contribute to a broader understanding of political communication and social media in Latin America (López-López & Vásquez-González, 2018; Muñiz, 2021; Valenzuela et al, 2021, 2022; Calvo et al, 2023). Specifically, we examine the use of social media in political campaigns (Brandao, 2022; Luna et al., 2022; Pallister, 2021; Scherman et al., 2011) and the importance of these tools in issue selection, populist communication indices, negative campaigning and interaction between parties, candidates and voters.

Hypothesis H1 examines whether the new Chilean political actors have focused their Facebook campaigns on divisive hot topics. The results partially support this hypothesis. It can be observed that only the new parties at the political extremes, such as PLR and CS, focused on divisive issues such as crime, drug trafficking and inequality, respectively. This finding is in line with the literature, which emphasizes the importance of selecting relevant and divisive topics to increase the visibility of messages on social media (Bene et al., 2022). However, these topics do not form the core of the new parties' discourse. The PDG, for example, is characterized by a low thematic profile and focuses on candidate promotion and online campaigning. The PLR also pursues this strategy, albeit with a focus on insecurity and drugs. In contrast, CS is characterized by a more programmatic policy, focusing on routine issues on the political agenda but highlighting human rights and the environment, which are less prominent in the polls. This approach suggests an adaptation of the issue-ownership strategy (Petrocik, 1996), where left-wing parties emphasize social and environmental issues, while the radical right focuses on the economy and security. Remarkably, immigration played a subordinate role in the discourse of Chilean political actors during the 2021 campaign.

The analysis of thematic choices in the Chilean presidential elections shows a diversification of strategies by emerging parties seeking to differentiate themselves in a highly competitive digital environment by focusing on specific voter niches on platforms such as Facebook (Luna et al., 2022). This approach underlines the importance of tailoring communication content to the expectations and concerns of the audience and thus increasing the effectiveness of the messages in the election campaign.

Regarding hypothesis H2, which states that new political actors use a higher level of populist communication on Facebook, the results partially confirm this assumption. Two of the three new political parties analyzed exhibit higher levels of

populist communication compared to traditional actors, which is consistent with previous studies worldwide (Nai, 2018; Güvercin, 2022; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; De Vrese, 2018; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017; Moffitt, 2016; Viviani & Marco, 2019) and in Latin America (Brandao, 2022; Waisbord, 2018). Moreover, in line with the literature, populist messages are more prevalent in radical parties, especially when they are in opposition (Ernst et al., 2017; Fenoll, 2022). An interesting case at the local level is the populist communication of the current president of El Salvador, Nayib Bukele, during the 2019 election campaign, which he combined with religious elements (Siles et al., 2023). However, it is worth noting that the proportion of populist messages in Chile (13.9% of posts) is significantly lower than in other contexts, such as the European Parliament elections (Lilleker & Balaban, 2021).

Hypothesis H3, which focuses on ideological differences in the type of populist communication used, is supported. Populist discourse is more common among conservative political actors, who often appeal to political and media elites, exclude external groups, and bypass traditional media. This pattern is consistent with research in the Latin American context (Luna & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2021; Jatobá & Andrade, 2022; Waisbord & Amado, 2017) and in other geographical contexts (Engesser et al., 2017). Notably, the Chilean right has not targeted immigrants or ethnic or cultural minorities in this election, in contrast to the discourse of right-wing populist parties in Europe (Fenoll, 2022).

In addition, we analyze the case of the center-right candidate Franco Parisi (PDG), who, although presenting himself as more moderate than José Antonio Kast (PLR) of the radical right, uses a more populist discourse directed almost exclusively against political and media elites. In contrast to Kast, Parisi avoids exclusionary populist rhetoric, which enables him to channel the dissatisfaction of the population without alienating any social sector. This “catch-all party” strategy avoids ideological confrontations and attacks on minorities. On the other hand, the populist messages of the radical left are characterized by appeals to the true people, who are portrayed as subjugated by economic elites and capitalism, which is in line with previous research (Engesser et al., 2017; Reinemann et al., 2016).

Hypothesis H4 examines whether new political parties and negative campaigning increase user interaction on social media. The results suggest that new parties attract more interaction, but negative campaigning is not a decisive factor, which is consistent with Pallister's (2021) study in Guatemala. However, according to Brandao (2022), Bolsonaro's 2018 campaign in Brazil is an exception, where negativity on Twitter and YouTube led to more posts and positive sentiment. This suggests that users may be more attracted to the novel and emotional or viral content of new parties, while negative campaigns may lose effectiveness

due to saturation (Bene et al., 2022; Kitzberger et al., 2020). Furthermore, the complexity of demonstrating how Facebook's algorithms influence users' political decisions over a short period of time, such as an election campaign, is discussed (González-Bailón et al., 2023; Guess et al., 2023). Our findings complement the view of Valenzuela et al. (2012) that changes in the media environment and the growing influence of social media can influence voter behavior and increase political polarization.

In summary, this study shows that the extent of divisive issues and populist communication in the first round of elections in Chile was low compared to other regions, although populist communication strategies in social media have spread in other regions over the years (Luna & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2021). The absence of exclusionary populism against ethnic or cultural minorities is characteristic of the Chilean context. However, the presence of a populist discourse in two of the three new parties is worrying. Their integration into institutions makes their messages more visible and their electoral success could transfer this strategy to other parties (van Spanje, 2018), with the damage to society and democratic institutions that comes from the normalization of populist discourse (Moffitt, 2020). Given the fragmented communication context and the post-truth era (Waisbord, 2018), this could also lay the foundation for the emergence of new populist parties.

Finally, this study points to parallels between the strategies used on Facebook in the first round of the 2021 Chilean election campaign and those recently used in Brazil and Guatemala, where, according to Brandao (2023) and Pallister (2021), this social network was used to disseminate populist messages and simplified emotional narratives that challenge the collective search for truth and traditional public communication (Waisbord, 2018).

Despite its findings, this study has limitations. First, the analysis was based on Facebook posts during a specific election campaign, which may limit the generalizability of the results to other media, social networks or political communication contexts. Second, the study only focused on the first round of the 2021 Chilean presidential election, which does not necessarily reflect the strategies used in other campaign phases. Future research should explore the applicability of these findings to different social media platforms and electoral contexts to determine if there are different strategies. It is also important to analyze subsequent elections to determine whether the trends found in Chile are consistent over time or specific to the current political situation characterized by the pandemic and social unrest. In addition, following Scherman et al. (2011), it would be interesting to study the influence of the age of users to determine whether there is a relationship between the use of social media and the mobilization of

younger voters, who are the most active in digital environments. Finally, the analysis needs to be extended to other South American countries to determine whether the patterns observed are unique to Chile or representative of the region as a whole.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This publication is part of the project Digital Election Campaigning Worldwide (DigiWorld). The authors would like to thank all the partners who contributed to the project's infrastructure, the coding scheme, and the creation of the dataset used in this publication. A list of all cooperation partners can be found on the project website: <https://digidemo.ifkw.lmu.de/digiworld/>

REFERENCIAS

- Bene, M., Ceron, A., Fenoll, V., Haßler, J., Kruschinski, S., Larsson, A. O., Magin, M., Schlosser, K., & Wurst, A.-K. (2022). Keep Them Engaged! Investigating the Effects of Self-centered Social Media Communication Style on User Engagement in 12 European Countries. *Political Communication*, 39(4), 429-453. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2022.2042435>
- Brandao, F. (2022). Stabbed Democracy: How Social Media and Home Videos Made a Populist President in Brazil. In D. Taras & R. Davis. (Eds), *Electoral Campaigns, Media, and the New World of Digital Politics* (pp. 179-199). University of Michigan Press. <https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.12013603>
- Calvo, E., Ventura, T., Aruguete, N., & Waisbord, S. (2023). Winning! Election returns and engagement in social media. *PlosOne*, 18(3), e0281475. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0281475>
- De Vreese, C. H., Esser, F., Aalberg, T., Reinemann, C., & Stanyer, J. (2018). Populism as an expression of political communication content and style: A new perspective. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, 23(4), 423-438. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161218790035>
- Dimitrova, D. V. & Matthes, J. (2018). Social media in political campaigning around the world: Theoretical and methodological challenges. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, 95(2), 333-342. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1077699018770437>
- Engesser, S., Ernst, N., Esser, F., & Büchel, F. (2017). Populism and social media: How politicians spread a fragmented ideology. *Information, Communication & Society*, 20(8), 1109-1126. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2016.1207697>
- Ernst, N., Engesser, S., Büchel, F., Blassnig, S., & Esser, F. (2017). Extreme parties and populism: an analysis of Facebook and Twitter across six countries. *Information, Communication & Society*, 20(9), 1347-1364. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2017.1329333>

- Espacio Público – Ipsos. (2021). *Encuesta Chilenas y chilenos hoy. Desafiando los prejuicios, complejizando la discusión* (Chileans today. Challenging prejudices, complicating the discussion). Diciembre de 2021. https://espaciopublico.cl/nuestro_trabajo/encuesta-espacio-publico-ipsos-2021-chilenas-y-chilenos-hoy/
- Estudio Nacional de Opinión Pública N°85, Agosto 2021 (National Study of Public Opinion CEP, Survey No. 85, August 2021). (2021, September 15). *Centro de Estudios Públicos*. <https://www.cepchile.cl/encuesta/estudio-nacional-de-opinion-publica-n85-agosto-2021/>
- Fenoll, V. (2022). Political communication on Facebook and populism. The 2019 European Parliament election in Spain. *Communication & Society*, 35(3), 91-103. <https://doi.org/10.15581/003.35.3.91-103>
- González-Bailón, S., Lazer, D., Barberá, P., Zhang, M., Allcott, H., Brown, T., Crespo-Tenorio, A., Freelon, D., Gentzkow, M., Guess, A. M., Iyengar, S., Kim, Y. M., Malhotra, N., Moehler, D. C., Nyhan, B., Pan, J., Velasco Rivera, C., Settle, J. E., Thorson, E., Tromble, R., Wilkins, A., ... & Tucker, J. A. (2023). Asymmetric ideological segregation in exposure to political news on Facebook. *Science*, 381(6656), 392-398. <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.ade7138>
- Guess, A. M., Malhotra, N., Pan, J., Barberá, P., Allcott, H., Brown, T., Crespo-Tenorio, A., Dimmery, D., Freelon, D., Gentzkow, M., González-Bailón, S., Kennedy, E. H., Kim, Y. M., Lazer, D., Moehler, D. C., Nyhan, B., Rivera, C. V., Settle, J. E., Thomas, D. R., Thorson, E., ... & Tucker, J. A. (2023). How do social media feed algorithms affect attitudes and behavior in an election campaign? *Science*, 381(6656), 398-404. <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.abp9364>
- Güvercin, D. (2022). Digitalization and populism: Cross-country evidence. *Technology in Society*, 68, 101802. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techsoc.2021.101802>
- Haßler, J., Wurst, A.-K. & Schlosser, K. (2021). Analysing European Parliament Election Campaigns Across 12 Countries: A Computer-Enhanced Content Analysis Approach. In J. Haßler, M. Magin, U. Russmann, & V. Fenoll (Eds.), *Campaigning on Facebook in the 2019 European Parliament Election. Political Campaigning and Communication* (pp. 41-52). Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73851-8_3
- Jagers, J. & Walgrave, S. (2007). Populism as political communication style: An empirical study of political parties' discourse in Belgium. *European Journal of Political Research*, 46(3), 319-345. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00690.x>
- Jatobá, D. & Andrade, M. (2022). Fragmentos do discurso populista: A dicotomia amigo-inimigo na retórica do governo Jair Bolsonaro (Fragments of populist discourse: The friend-enemy dichotomy in the rhetoric of the Jair Bolsonaro government). *Revista Neiba, Cuadernos Argentina-Brasil*, 11(1), e67727. <https://doi.org/10.12957/neiba.2022.67727>
- Kast, J. A. [joseantoniokast]. (27 de octubre de 2021). Desde Chillán, junto a candidatos a Diputados y a Consejeros Regionales del Frente Social Cristiano, atrevi2 por recorrer Chile y conocer las verdaderas urgencias sociales y defender la libertad. [Video en directo]. Facebook. <https://www.facebook.com/joseantoniokast/videos/565680684657614>
- Kitzberger, P., Mitchelstein, E., Matassi, M., & Boczkowski, P. J. (2020). Minimal effects, maximum panic: social media and democracy in Latin America. *Social Media + Society*, 6(4). <https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305120984452>

- Lacy, S., Watson, B. R., Riffe, D., & Lovejoy, J. (2015). Issues and Best Practices in Content Analysis. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, 92(4), 791-811.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1077699015607338>
- Lilleker, D. G. & Balaban, D. C. (2021). Populism on Facebook. In J. Haßler, M. Magin, U. Russmann, & V. Fenoll (Eds.), *Campaigning on Facebook in the 2019 European Parliament Election. Political Campaigning and Communication* (pp. 267-282). Palgrave Macmillan.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73851-8_17
- López-López, P.-C. & Vásquez-González, J. (2018). Agenda temática y Twitter: elecciones presidenciales en América Latina durante el período 2015-2017 (Thematic agenda and Twitter: Presidential elections in Latin America during the 2015-2017 period). *Profesional De La Información*, 27(6), 1204-1214. <https://doi.org/10.3145/epi.2018.nov.04>
- Luna, J. P., Pérez, C., Toro, S., Rosenblatt, F., Poblete, B., Valenzuela, S., Cruz, A., Bro, N., Alcatruz, D., & Escobar, A. (2022). Much ado about Facebook? Evidence from 80 congressional campaigns in Chile. *Journal of Information Technology & Politics*, 19(2), 129-139.
- Luna, J. P. & Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2021). Castigo a los oficialismos y ciclo político de derecha en América Latina. *Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Política*, 30(1), 135-156.
<https://doi.org/10.26851/rucp.30.1.6>
- Lusoli, W. (2005). The Internet and the European Parliament elections: Theoretical perspectives, empirical investigations and proposals for research. *Information Polity. The International Journal of Government & Democracy in the Information Age*, 10 (3), 153-163.
<https://doi.org/10.3233/IP-2005-0080>
- Meléndez, C., Rovira Kaltwasser, C., & Sajuria, J. (2021). Chile 2020: pandemia y plebiscito constitucional. (Chile 2020: pandemic and constitutional plebiscite). *Revista de Ciencia Política (Santiago)*, 41(2). <https://doi.org/10.4067/S0718-090X2021005000114>
- Milli, S., Carroll, M., Wang, Y., Pandey, S., & Dragan, A. D. (2023). Engagement, User Satisfaction, and the Amplification of Divisive Content on Social Media. *Arxiv*.
<https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2305.16941>
- Moffitt, B. (2016). *The global rise of populism: Performance, political style, and representation*. Stanford University Press.
- Moffitt, B. (2020). *Populism*. Polity.
- Mudde, C. & Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2017). *Populism: A very short introduction*. Oxford University Press.
- Muñiz, C. (2021). Construyendo la polarización a través del discurso político. Análisis del uso de claves periféricas en la retórica del presidente mexicano López Obrador (Building polarization through political discourse. Analysis of the use of peripheral cues in the rhetoric of Mexican President López Obrador). *Cultura, lenguaje y representación*, 26, 149-165. <https://doi.org/10.6035/clr.5806>
- Nai, A. (2018). *Populist political communication in Europe*. Routledge.
- Nai, A. & Walter, A. S. (2015). Populist political communication in Europe: Comprehending the message. In J. A. Fuentes-Nieva & P. M. Llamas (Eds.), *The populist moment: A short history of the agrarian revolt in America* (pp. 227-244). Routledge.

- Newman, N., Fletcher, R., Eddy, K., Robertson, C. T., & Nielsen, R. K. (2023). *Digital News Report 2023*. Reuters Institute.
- Pallister, K. (2021). Digital Caudillos: The Use of Social Media in Guatemalan Presidential Campaigns. *Journal of Politics in Latin America*, 13(2), 269-283.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802x211010319>
- Papp, Z., & Patkós, V. (2019). The Macro-Level Driving Factors of Negative Campaigning in Europe. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, 24(1), 27-48.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161218803426>
- Petrocik, J. R. (1996). Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study. *American Journal of Political Science*, 40(8), 25-50. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2111797>
- Reinemann, C., Stanyer, J., & Scherr, S. (2016). Hard and soft news: A review of concepts, operationalizations and key findings. *Journalism*, 13(2), 147-165.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884911427803>
- Rojas Casimiro, M., Ruiz Rodríguez, L. M., & Toro Monroy, P. (2022). La progresión de los clivajes en el sistema de partidos chileno (Cleavages progression in the Chilean party system). *Revista Notas Históricas y Geográficas*, 1(30), 224-250.
<https://revistanotashistoricasygeograficas.cl/index.php/nhyg/article/view/510>
- Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2023). *Apoyo y rechazo a la ultraderecha en Chile* (Support and rejection of the ultra-right in Chile). Fundación Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Chile y Ultra-Lab.
- Scherman, A., Arriagada, A., & Valenzuela, S. (2011). ¿Hacia una nueva ciudadanía multifuncional? Uso de medios digitales, redes sociales online y participación política (Towards a new multifunctional citizenship? Use of digital media, online social networks and political participation). *Revista Latinoamericana de Opinión Pública*, (2), 159-191.
<https://doi.org/10.14201/rlop.22276>
- Sierra, A. & Rodríguez-Virgili, J. (2020). Comunicación política y medios sociales: análisis del estado de la cuestión de 2008 a 2018 (Political communication and social media: State of the art from 2008 to 2018). *Revista Mediterránea de Comunicación*, 11(1), 245-260.
<https://doi.org/10.14198/MEDCOM2020.11.1.21>
- Siles, I., Guevara, E., Tristán-Jiménez, L., & Carazo, C. (2023). Populism, Religion, and Social Media in Central America. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, 28(1), 138-159.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/19401612211032884>
- Taras, D. & Davis, R. (2022). *Electoral campaigns, media, and the new world of digital politics*. University of Michigan Press.
- UPA [UPAunionpatriotica] (21 de noviembre de 2021). Esclarecedor comunicado de la #listadelpueblo. [Imagen adjunta]. Facebook.
<https://www.facebook.com/100068892533031/posts/1581182385558914/>
- van Spanje, J. (2018). *Controlling the Electoral Marketplace*. Palgrave.
- Valenzuela, S., Arriagada, A., & Scherman, A. (2012). The social media basis of youth protest behavior: The case of Chile. *Journal of Communication*, 62(2), 299-314.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2012.01635.x>

- Valenzuela, S., Bachmann, I., & Bargsted, M. (2021). The personal is the political? What do Whatsapp users share and how it matters for news knowledge, polarization and participation in Chile. *Digital Journalism*, 9(2), 155-175.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2019.1693904>
- Valenzuela, S., Muñiz, C., & Santos, M. (2022). Social media and belief in misinformation in Mexico: a case of maximal panic, minimal effects? *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, 19401612221088988. <https://doi.org/10.1177/19401612221088988>
- Viviani, L. & Marco, D. (2019). Populism and Euroscepticism in Podemos and in the Five Star Movement. Faraway, so close? *Partecipazione e Conflitto*, 12(1), 197-216.
<https://doi.org/10.1285/i20356609v12i1p197>
- Waisbord, S. (2018). The elective affinity between post-truth communication and populist politics. *Communication Research and Practice*, 4(1), 17-34.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/22041451.2018.1428928>
- Waisbord, S. & Amado, A. (2017). Populist communication by digital means: presidential Twitter in Latin America. *Information, Communication & Society*, 20(9), 1330-1346.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2017.1328521>
- Wiesehomeier, N., Singer, M., & Ruth-Lovell, S. P. (2021). Political Representation, Executives, and Political Parties Survey: Data from Expert Surveys in 18 Latin American Countries, 2018-2019. PREPPS Latam V2. Harvard Dataverse. <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/JLOYIJ>

SOBRE LOS AUTORES

PERCY PEÑA-VICUÑA, doctor en Educación por la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, máster en Comunicación y Educación por la Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona y periodista de la Universidad Católica del Norte, donde actualmente es profesor e investigador en la escuela de Periodismo. Sus áreas de investigación incluyen la comunicación política en redes sociales, con especial interés en el populismo y la desinformación. Es miembro del grupo de investigación DigiWorld.

 <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4997-547X>

VICENTE FENOLL, doctor en Comunicación Audiovisual por la Universidad de Valencia, donde ejerce como profesor en el departamento de Teoría de los Lenguajes y Ciencias de la Comunicación desde 2014. Tiene una amplia experiencia profesional en informativos de televisión y en campañas electorales. Es miembro de los grupos de investigación MediaFlows (www.mediaflows.es) y DigiWorld (<https://digidemo.ifkw.lmu.de/digiworld/>). Sus áreas de investigación son el populismo, los medios sociales y la comunicación política. Ha sido investigador visitante en diversas universidades americanas y europeas.

 <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5851-4237>

PAMELA ROMERO-LIZAMA, periodista y licenciada en Comunicación social, magíster en Comunicación y doctora en Ciencias humanas con mención en Discurso y cultura por la Universidad Austral de Chile. Actualmente es académica del departamento de Mediaciones y Subjetividades de la facultad de Ciencias sociales de la Universidad de Playa Ancha. Sus líneas de investigación son representaciones sociales y análisis crítico del discurso de los medios de comunicación, pluralismo mediático, comunicación y periodismo intercultural, movimientos sociales y estudios de género.

 <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0191-128X>